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Costs and fairness of forest carbon sequestration in EU climate 
policy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Large emissions of greenhouse gases are expected to cause major environmental problems in the 
future. European policy makers have therefore declared that they aim to implement cost-efficient 
and fair policies to reduce carbon emissions. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the 
cost of the EU policies for 2020 can be reduced through the inclusion of carbon sequestration as 
and abatement option while also equity is improved. The assessment is done by numerical 
calculations using a chance-constrained partial equilibrium model of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme and national effort-sharing targets, where forest sequestration is introduced as an 
uncertain abatement option. Fairness is evaluated by calculation of Gini-coefficients for six 
equity criteria to policy outcomes. The estimated Gini-coefficients range between 0.11 and 0.32 
for the current policy, between 0.16 and 0.66 if sequestration is included and treated as certain, 
and between 0.19 and 0.38 when uncertainty about sequestration is taken into account and 
policy-makers wish to meet targets with at least 90 percent probability. The results show that 
fairness is reduced when sequestration is included and that the impact is larger when 
sequestration is treated as certain.  
 
 
Keywords:  carbon sequestration, costs, fairness, EU climate policy 
JEL: D63, Q48, Q52,  Q58,  
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a long-term threat to the environment and to human life with potentially 
serious consequences (IPCC, 2007). Policy-makers in Europe have adopted EU-wide policies to 
reduce the amount of carbon emitted to the atmosphere. Both cost-efficiency and equity were 
stated to be key decision criteria when implementing the EU climate policy (European 
Commission, 2008a; 2008b). 
 
Carbon emissions can be reduced through reductions in fossil fuel consumption, but also through 
increased use of renewable energies, improved energy efficiency, and increased carbon 
sequestration. Carbon sequestration is here defined as the net uptake of carbon from the 
atmosphere by vegetation and soils. Currently, carbon sequestration is not an accepted abatement 
method within EU’s climate policy. Arguments against sequestration are, e.g. the uncertainty and 
non-permanence in delivering emission reductions as well as the lack of harmonized methods for 
monitoring and reporting changes in sequestration from land use, land-use change and forestry 
(European Commission, 2008a). The European Commission also fears that the inclusion of 
sequestration would reduce the simplicity, transparency and predictability of the EU ETS (EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme).  
 
However, carbon sequestration has a great potential in reducing the overall cost of meeting the 
targets (Bosetti et al., 2009; Gren et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2009; Sohngen, 2009) and should 
therefore be an interesting option for politicians who are concerned with cost-efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of a cheap abatement option, such as carbon sequestration, could 
alter the cost allocation among countries. Therefore, the fairness of the policy could either 
increase or decrease. Countries with large areas of forest land, high sequestration per unit of 
land, and low uncertainty about sequestration would benefit more from the inclusion of 
sequestration. The impact on equity will, however, depend on whether these countries carry more 
or less of the burden under the current policy, compared to the average European country.    
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The purpose of this paper is to assess whether the cost of the EU policies for 2020 can be 
reduced through the inclusion of carbon sequestration as an abatement option while also equity is 
improved. Fairness is assessed based on the outcome of cost-efficient policies which meet EU 
targets for 2020, with and without forest carbon sequestration. These targets are (i) a 21 percent 
emission reduction in the ETS sectors (Official Journal, 2009a) and (ii) national targets for the 
non-ETS sectors, i.e. the non-trading sectors, corresponding in total to a 10 percent reduction 
(Official Journal, 2009b) compared to the 2005 level. The member state target is divided among 
member states taking, among other criteria, GDP per capita differences into account (European 
Commission, 2008b). 
 
The costs of carbon reductions are relatively straightforward to calculate, but the assessment of 
fairness is more challenging since there is no single definition and operationalization of the 
concept. We therefore use different theories of justice, with associated equity principles, for the 
definition of operative equity criteria. These equity criteria are then evaluated through the 
calculation of Gini-coefficients.  
 
Many previous studies have discussed ethical issues with a main focus on the damage cost of 
climate change (e.g. Dietz et al. 2008; Srinivasan, 2010). Our focus is, however, rather on the 
equity of climate policy. This issue is analyzed in the literature through examination of the 
impact on costs of applying different fair rules for the allocation of emission reductions across 
countries or different fair initial allocations of tradable emission permit (Blanchard et al., 2003; 
Bosello and Roson, 2002; Bosello et al., 2003; Groot, 2010; Kverndokk and Rose, 2008; Mattoo 
and Subramanian, 2011; Metz, 2000; Ringius et al., 1998). Several equity principles are then 
operationalized and applied to international climate policy (Ringius et al., 1998; Rose et al., 
1998; Schmidt and Koschel, 1998). Rose et al. (1998) examine nine equity principles which lay 
the basis for the distribution of emission permits, and the associated welfare effects on nine 
world regions. Their simulations show that the net cost or net benefit after emission trading is 
similar for several principles e.g. sovereignty and horizontal, but the outcome under the  
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egalitarian principle differs, as all the industrialized countries are buyers and all the developing 
countries are sellers of permits.   
 
Our approach differs from those by taking the allocation of emission allowances and targets set 
by the EU institutions as given and investigating the policy outcome using different equity 
criteria. Also with a focus on outcomes, fairness in EU climate policy has earlier been evaluated 
by Marklund and Samakovlis (2007), who show that equity and cost-efficiency both explain the 
EU burden-sharing agreement under the Kyoto Protocol. Fei et al. (2011), who analyze 
international equity by studying the historical cumulative emissions per capita, and evaluating 
those using Gini-coefficients. This paper also adds to the literature by the inclusion of stochastic 
and deterministic forest sequestration as an abatement option. 
 
Our calculations show that the Gini-coefficients for the current policy are equal to or below the 
Gini-coefficient for income in the EU member states. When including uncertain sequestration, 
Gini-coefficients are larger, i.e. the distribution is less fair, but are still below the Gini-coefficient 
for income for many of the equity criteria. In a third scenario, where sequestration is treated as 
certain, Gini-coefficients are above that of the income distribution except for the egalitarian 
criterion, i.e. the distribution is relatively unfair. The size of Gini-coefficients varies between 
equity criteria, and the egalitarian criterion gives a lower coefficient than other criteria in all 
three scenarios. This criterion gives extreme results also in Rose et al. (1998), as noted above.     
 
This paper is organized as follows: first, we describe different theories of justice and how they 
can be interpreted as different equity principles and operationalized as equity criteria. Next, we 
present allocations of costs and emissions for different countries under cost-efficient solutions. 
This is followed by the calculation and analysis of six alternative operative equity criteria. The 
paper ends with a discussion and conclusions.  
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2. Theories of justice, equity principles and methods for measuring equity 
Three different theories of justice which form a basis for analyzing equity are presented here. 
These are utilitarianism, Rawlsian, and libertarian theories of justice and they all stem from the 
philosophical literature (Kverndokk and Rose, 2008). They are global theories centered on 
society as a whole and are concerned with the compensation of people with relatively low level 
of income. The theories of justice lay the basis for the most common equity principles that are 
used in the economic literature. Equity principles are concerned with the normative aspect of 
distribution of goods and rights, and are here applied to the allocation of costs, abatement and 
emissions among EU countries. The equity principles give the foundation for the operative 
criteria used for measuring equity in this paper. 
 
2.1 Theories of justice  
 
According to utilitarianism, a society is just to the extent that its laws and institutions are set up 
to promote the greatest overall welfare of its members (Mulgan, 2007). It aims to distribute 
goods, interpreted in a broad sense, so as to maximize the total utility of the members of this 
society. For this purpose a utilitarian welfare function, in which all individuals have an equal 
weight, can be used. Utilitarianism does not explicitly address equity, but the objective of 
welfare maximization implies a certain distribution as an optimal outcome. In the utilitarian 
theory, it is the actions that lead to welfare improvements that are central, which means that the 
ends might justify the means to get there.  
 
Rawls (1971) criticises utilitarianism because he believes that it has no respect for the individual, 
since a person is not regarded as valuable and worth protecting in his/her own right. Rawls 
instead proposes three key principles. The first is the principle of equal liberty, which is 
concerned with individual rights. The second is the difference principle, which distributes 
wealth, income, power and authority to the greatest benefit of the disadvantaged. The third is the  
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principle of fair equality of opportunities, which requires that individuals with similar skills, 
abilities and motivation get equal opportunities.  
 
The third philosophical theory of justice is the libertarian theory, which states that individual 
freedom prevails unless others may be harmed as a result (Machan, 2006). This idea has 
similarities to the Pareto efficiency concept in economics, which says that there is only an 
improvement in welfare when one or more individuals benefit due to a change in the resource 
allocation, as long as other persons are at least as well off as before. The difference is the central 
focus in libertarianism on ensuring that fundamental liberties and rights of individuals are 
respected in processes and procedures.  
 
The theories of justice can serve as a basis for the development of different equity principles, and 
operative criteria for measuring equity. However, since theories of justice are broadly defined at 
the societal level, several theories of justice can be in accordance with one, specific equity 
principle and vice versa (Kverndokk and Rose, 2008).  In the following we develop on earlier 
work on climate change and equity by discussing links between the theories of justice and the 
equity principles.  
 
2.2 Equity principles; definitions, measurements, and relations to theories of justice  
Some principles, such as the horizontal equity principle requiring equal treatment of nations, are 
easier to link to a specific theory, while others are more difficult such as e.g. the ability to pay 
principle. We apply the principles and associated measurements suggested by Ringius et al. 
(1998) and Rose et al (1998), which are presented in Table 1 but also develop a new 
measurement for the market justice criterion, which fits our aim to analyze equity on emission 
trading markets.  
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Table 1. Equity principles, basic definitions, operative equity criteria and mathematical  
              expression 
Equity 
principle 
Basic definition Operative equity criteria Mathematical expressionc,d 
Ability to 
pay 
Abatement cost should 
vary with national 
economic wellbeing 
Abatement costs as a 
proportion to GDP should be 
equal across nationsa 
= 𝐴𝑏.𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,2020  
Egalitarian All people should have 
an equal right to pollute  
Emissions to population 
should be equal across 
countriesa,b 
= 𝐸𝑖,2020 𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖,2005  
Horizontal All nations should be 
treated equally 
Net cost to GDP should be 
equal across countriesa,b = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,2020  
Market 
Justice 
The market is fair All countries should face the 
same MACa 
= αi,2020ETS (𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑆) +       (1 −∝𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆 )𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆 
Polluters pay Nations should carry an 
abatement burden 
according to their 
emissions 
Net cost to emissions should 
be equal across countriesb = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐸𝑖,2005  
Sovereignty All nations have an equal 
right to pollute and be 
protected from pollution 
All countries should face the 
same emission reduction 
target in percentagesa,b 
= (𝐸𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆 −  𝐸𝑖,2005𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆)
𝐸𝑖,2005𝐸𝑇𝑆+𝑁𝐸𝑇𝑆  
    
a Rose et al. (1998), b Ringius et al. (1998), c Complete equality is achieved when all countries have the 
same outcome (number) for each measurement. dAb.= abatement cost, E.=Emissions, MAC = Marginal 
Abatement Cost, ETS and NETS refer to the ETS sector and the non-ETS sector respectively and αETS is 
calculated as:    𝛼𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆 = 𝐸.𝑅𝑒𝑑.𝑖,2020𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡 𝐸.𝑅𝑒𝑑.𝑖,2020      
Abatement cost is defined as the total cost for abatement measures within a country. Net cost is defined as 
the abatement cost at national level plus any gain or loss from trading allowances. Marginal cost is the 
cost of the last unit of emission reduction. See section 3 for the calculations of these costs.  
 
The first equity principle in Table 1, ability to pay, states that the total abatement cost at the 
national level should be proportional to economic wellbeing. This equity principle is difficult to 
link with a specific theory of justice. However, it could be linked to the difference principle of 
Rawls theory of justice, because the criterion implies that poorer countries should have a smaller 
abatement burden than affluent countries. Poorer countries then have an opportunity to catch up 
with richer ones. One can also see traces of utilitarianism, since a higher absolute burden carried 
by the affluent should lead to a higher overall welfare, provided that the utility function is 
concave.  
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The egalitarian equity principle states that all people are equal and should therefore be entitled 
to an equal share of the global atmosphere (Ringius et al., 1998; Rose et al., 1998). This implies 
that each person should be allowed to emit the same amount of emissions regardless of where he 
or she lives. This principle is not easily linked to a specific theory of justice. It can be associated 
with Rawls’ theory of justice in the sense that the nation with the smallest per capita emissions is 
given the right to emit more, and benefit from the production associated with these emissions. 
That should also lead to an overall welfare improvement if the marginal benefit of emissions is 
larger in countries with small emissions, i.e. the principle can also be linked to utilitarianism.  
 
The horizontal equity principle states that all nations should be treated equally. The notion of 
being treated equally can be linked to the libertarian theory, in which procedures should defend 
people’s or nation’s rights. Ringius et al. (1998) and Rose et al. (1998) suggest that this could be 
interpreted as equity implying equal net cost in proportion to GDP across all countries. This 
interpretation seems rather linked to utilitarianism and Rawls’ theory of justice, with the same 
arguments as for the ability to pay principle.  
 
The market justice equity criterion can be associated with the libertarian theory of justice if 
market transactions can be seen as fair processes or procedures. Rose et al. (1998) suggest an 
operative criterion implying that countries are allocated allowances according to their 
willingness to pay for those on the margin. Given that this criterion is not applicable to 
outcomes, we suggest the use of a new operative criterion, which fits our purposes. The market 
justice criterion is then calculated as the weighted MAC (marginal cost of abatement) in ETS and 
non-ETS sectors, weighted by the fraction of abatement in the sectors. Complete equality is the 
achieved when all countries have an equal, sector-weighted MAC, which requires either that 
there is no non-ETS sector or that MAC in the non-ETS sector is identical across countries.     
 
The polluters’ pay equity principle states that each country should pay in proportion to its 
emissions. This principle can, in a straightforward manner, be associated with the utilitarian  
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theory of justice as higher pollution is usually linked to higher income from production and 
hence, the more affluent countries will pay more. This is the case for CO2 emissions in Europe; 
see Table C1-C3 in Appendix C, where the net cost to emissions is generally higher for rich 
countries. However for other pollutants and other parts of the world, this link need not apply. 
Given lower marginal utility of consumption in rich countries compared to less affluent 
countries, this will, in our case, imply higher utility under this principle.  
 
The sovereignty equity principle states that each country has a ‘basic right’ to the atmosphere 
(Rose et al., 1998). This means that each country should reduce emissions by the same 
percentage. Implicitly, this presupposes that the initial distribution is fair. This principle is hard 
to link to one specific theory of justice. It can be associated with utilitarian and Rawls theory of 
justice, the latter because large emitters must undertake more abatement in absolute terms than 
small emitters, thereby benefitting the disadvantaged countries, provided that larger emissions 
are associated with a larger wealth or income. It is thereby also connected to utilitarianism 
because the allocation of burden is welfare improving for the same reasons as discussed above.  
 
Finally, we note that that EU policy-makers have stated an aim to take GDP per capita into 
account (European Commission, 2008b), which seems to be closely related to the horizontal and 
ability to pay principles, that relate costs to GDP.  
 
2.3 Measuring equity in terms of Lorenz curves and Gini-coefficients  
 
The Gini-coefficient is a well-established method for determining equity in a distribution, most 
known for its use in measuring equity in income distributions, but also frequently used to analyze 
the consequences of climate change and climate change policy. According to Yitzhaki (1979), 
the Gini-coefficient is particularly well suited to a distributional analysis, because it is associated 
with the relative deprivation theory. According to this theory, perceived deprivation depends on 
the position of each country relative to other countries and not deprivation in absolute terms.  
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This means that countries compare and evaluate the outcome of a policy against the outcome for 
others. This seems relevant to the analysis of politically negotiated agreements on burden-
sharing within climate policy (e.g. Groot, 2010; Fei et al. 2011). The wide-spread use and the 
relevance of relative deprivation motivate the choice of the Gini-coefficient as a measure of 
inequality in this paper.  
 
The Gini-coefficient is not based on a well-defined value judgement applied to inequality in 
distributions. On the contrary, the Gini-coefficient can be equal for different distributions, as it is 
insensitive to where in the distribution deviations can be found. For example, two groups of 
countries can have the same Gini-coefficient, despite that one group contains relatively many 
poor and the other relatively many rich, since what matters in the calculations is the absolute 
difference between the countries within each group. Thereby, it differs from the Atkinson index 
of inequality, which introduces a parameter, which ranges from zero (indifference to inequality); 
to infinity (representing the Rawlsian criterion) that evaluates distributions according to the 
income of the poorest people of society.  
 
The Gini-coefficient is calculated from the Lorenz curve, which was originally a graphical 
representation of the cumulative proportion of individuals’ income, mapped against the 
corresponding cumulative proportion of these individuals. In this study, the Lorenz curve 
represents the distribution of a chosen equity criterion. For example, the Lorenz curve for the 
egalitarian criterion shows the cumulative proportion of emissions against the cumulative 
proportion of the population, see e.g. Groot (2010). Figure 1 shows an example of a Lorenz 
curve based on the egalitarian criterion. The Figure also includes a 45° equity line that depicts a 
perfectly equal distribution i.e. when all countries have the same outcome under a given equity 
criterion. The Gini-coefficient is calculated by dividing area A, i.e. the area between the 45° 
equity line and the Lorenz curve, by area A+B in Figure 1, see Barlan (2010). 
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Figure 1. Lorenz curve and equity line 
 
3. Input data for the equity criteria calculations 
 
A non-linear programming model is used to calculate total abatement costs, net costs after trade, 
marginal costs, and emissions when EU targets are met in a cost-efficient manner. The model 
covers all 27 EU member states and includes two abatement options; reductions in fossil fuel 
consumption and sequestration in forests (Gren et al., 2009)1. Cost for reductions in fossil fuels 
in the ETS and non-ETS sectors are calculated as decreases in consumer surplus2, for three types 
of fuel; oil (heavy fuel oil, light fuel oil/heating oil, gasoline, diesel and jet kerosene), coal (hard 
coal and lignite) and natural gas. For each type of fossil fuel, we distinguish between the ETS 
and non-ETS sectors, where the ETS sector includes heavy energy-using installations, 
manufacturing industry and parts of the aviation sector and the non-ETS sector includes other 
industries, households and transportation. Total abatement cost is then determined by the  
 
A
B
Lorenz curve
45⁰ equity line
Cumulative
emissions, %
Cumulative
population, %
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reductions made across all fuel types in these two sectors. Carbon dioxide emissions are 
calculated using emission coefficients for each type of fossil fuel.  
 
The model also includes carbon sequestration in soils and vegetation on forest land. 
Sequestration per unit of forest land is determined by an emission coefficient which is associated 
with uncertainty, measured as the coefficient of variation, see Appendix A Table A1. The 
uncertainty arises from weather-driven variability in biological processes, and land heterogeneity 
in combination with uncertainties in land use data (Gren et al., 2009). Uncertainty about the 
carbon content of fossil fuels could, hypothetically play a similar role for decision makers, but 
has a negligible impact on cost-efficient policies (Gren et al., 2012). 
  
There is no cost associated with the forest sequestration included in our model. This is explained 
by current forest management practices within the EU, which imply large positive sequestration 
because only around 60 percent of the annual gross increment is harvested (Eurostat, 2011). 
Carbon sequestration thus occurs at zero cost, as a by-product of conventional forestry. The cost 
savings achieved in our model when including sequestration in climate policy is thus also an 
estimate of the value of this free carbon sequestration3.  
 
Costs and equity outcomes are compared for three different scenarios: 1) without forest 
sequestration; 2) with forest sequestration and uncertainty; and 3) with forest sequestration, but 
without uncertainty. Scenario 1) and 3) are thus deterministic, while scenario 2) is stochastic. To 
allow for uncertainty, chance-constrained programming is used (Charnes and Cooper, 1963). A 
probabilistic constraint is introduced, where it is assumed that policy makers want to achieve EU 
carbon reduction target with, at least, a subjectively chosen probability. This implies that forest 
sequestration is associated with one advantage, the expected emission reduction achieved 
through sequestration, and one disadvantage, the uncertainty. The latter implies that larger 
reduction efforts must be implemented when the policy-maker dislikes uncertainty compared to 
when the he or she is indifferent to uncertainty. Policy makers thus face a trade-off between low  
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costs and high reliability in target achievement. For scenario 2), it is assumed that the EU CO2 
reduction targets should be achieved with a 90 percent probability, which is the reliability level 
also chosen by Gren et al. (2012).  
 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the results of scenario 1) and 2), that are used in the equity criteria 
calculations. The results of scenario 3) can be found in Appendix B, Table B2. Additional data, 
necessary to calculate the equity criteria, can be found in Appendix B, Table B1. Table 2 shows 
the MAC in the non-ETS sector in the scenario with and without sequestration. The large 
variation between countries is due to differences in abatement cost functions and national targets. 
In the scenario with sequestration, the MAC is either equal or lower than in the scenario without 
sequestration, as sequestration is costless. The largest MAC reduction occurs in Latvia, followed 
by Sweden, Hungary and Slovenia, which is due these countries having large forest areas, high 
sequestration and low uncertainty. Nine countries have the same marginal cost with and without 
sequestration, and the explanation is the opposite: small forest areas, low sequestration and high 
uncertainty, implying that forest sequestration is not included as an abatement option.  
 
In the ETS sector, the MAC is 29€/ton CO2 without and 24€/ton CO2 with sequestration, which 
is below the MAC in the non-ETS sector except for Austria, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Malta 
and Sweden. The reason for a higher MAC in the non-ETS sector is stringent national targets and 
no trade of allowances across countries. The MAC in the ETS sector in the scenario without 
sequestration can be compared to the current allowance price on the ETS market, which is 
approximately 4 €/ton CO2 (Point Carbon, 2013). Although our result is much higher than the 
current price, it is in line with results from earlier studies, e.g. Capros et al. (2008) and 
Stankeviciute et al. (2007).  
 
 
 
 
15 
 
  
 
 
Table 2. MAC and abatement costs in the cost-efficient solutions with and without forest  
               sequestration and when the probability of achieving the EU targets is set at 0.9.  
  
MAC w/o 
seq. 
MAC 
with seq. 
Abatement 
cost w/o seq. 
Abatement 
cost with seq. 
Unit  
€/ton CO2 
(PPP 
adj.) 
€/ton CO2 
(PPP adj.) Million Euro  Million Euro  
Austria 144 22 945 72 
Belgium 128 112 1247 934 
Bulgaria 215 215 278 257 
Cyprus 62 62 16 14 
Czech Rep. 95 40 412 246 
Denmark 185 130 680 355 
Estonia 184 39 120 59 
Finland 83 20 301 96 
France 112 68 2765 1003 
Germany  132 22 6104 1455 
Greece 70 70 368 326 
Hungary 324 107 677 242 
Ireland 123 123 555 551 
Italy 153 112 5787 3459 
Latvia 828 45 424 15 
Lithuania 13 13 12 8 
Luxembourg  138 138 241 240 
Malta 6 6 2 2 
Netherlands 37 37 1357 1306 
Poland 147 41 1785 1028 
Portugal 90 36 326 128 
Romania 260 260 1095 1063 
Slovakia 312 228 579 229 
Slovenia 207 31 228 41 
Spain 194 100 3569 1324 
Sweden 311 19 2336 38 
United Kingdom 159 121 4999 3019 
 
 
Table 2 shows that abatement costs are lower when sequestration is included, except for Malta. 
The total cost is reduced by 53 percent. Again, Latvia, Sweden, Hungary and Slovenia have the  
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highest cost reductions, and the reasons for this are the same as for the change in the MAC. 
However, countries can also have a higher than average reduction in abatement cost when 
sequestration is included, even if they have a lower than average reduction in the marginal cost, 
and vice versa. Examples of such countries are, in this case, the Czech republic, where MAC is 
reduced more than the average, whereas total abatement costs are not, and Denmark, where the 
opposite is the case. Countries with low marginal costs can have stringent national target and 
also, will carry out more of the abatement within the ETS, implying that the total cost can be 
high, and vice versa. The relationship between MAC and total abatement cost can change to 
different degree when sequestration is included depending on the shape and location of cost 
functions.  
 
Table 3 shows the net cost, which is the sum of abatement costs and net gains from allowance 
trading, for all countries with and without sequestration. The net cost varies between countries 
for the same reasons as explained above, but is also determined by the allocation of emission 
allowances. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have the highest net cost in 
both scenarios. These are also the countries with the highest GDP (see Appendix B, Table B1) 
and therefore have are a larger national abatement burden as well as fewer emission allowances. 
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Table 3. Net costs and net emissions in the cost-efficient solutions with and without forest  
               sequestration and when the probability of achieving the EU targets is set at 0.9.  
  
Net cost 
w/o seq. 
Net cost 
with seq.  
Emissions 
2020 w/o seq. 
Emissions 
2020 with 
seq. 
Unit  
Million 
Euro  
Million 
Euro  
Thousand ton 
CO2 
Thousand ton 
CO2 
Austria 989 128 64172 51572 
Belgium 1089 821 95122 95687 
Bulgaria 83 115 35960 28965 
Cyprus 12 13 6735 6803 
Czech Rep. 227 185 87174 88472 
Denmark 770 458 37473 37898 
Estonia 42 -3 11668 8300 
Finland 399 211 43840 13949 
France 2813 1098 330060 264670 
Germany  7224 2752 626800 609300 
Greece 367 364 82790 80185 
Hungary 580 170 49121 47232 
Ireland 622 609 39403 38451 
Italy 6346 4054 417980 329000 
Latvia 366 -30 7224 -13260 
Lithuania -82 -66 10589 3305 
Luxembourg  237 237 10694 10753 
Malta 2 2 2235 2262 
Netherlands 1505 1460 155840 155280 
Poland 991 562 230650 191440 
Portugal 318 127 59808 55784 
Romania 383 500 82620 35471 
Slovakia 413 98 31931 30620 
Slovenia 227 41 13000 9547 
Spain 3503 1350 303970 288050 
Sweden 2290 9 45360 25362 
United Kingdom 5709 3854 451530 457680 
 
The inclusion of sequestration generally reduces the net cost except for Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
Romania. The reason is reduced gain from allowance trading in these three countries. The  
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allowance price in the ETS sector falls when sequestration is included. Then countries which are 
net sellers both before and after the inclusion of sequestration, and do not substantially increase 
their sales, gain less from allowance trading. The countries that experience the highest cost 
saving by including sequestration are Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and Sweden. This is 
partly the same countries as those where marginal and total abatement costs fall, but the 
inclusion of net gains from allowance trading implies that e.g. Estonia is comparatively better off 
when net costs are compared than if we look only at abatement costs. This is because Estonia 
substantially increases its sales of emission allowances.    
 
Table 3 also shows cost-efficient emissions in 2020 with and without sequestration. When 
sequestration is included, the emission level is higher in Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Luxemburg, Malta and the United Kingdom than in the scenario without 
sequestration. The reason is that national targets can be reached with smaller reductions in fossil 
fuels than would otherwise be the case, and that the lower allowance prices implies that for high-
cost countries, increased purchases of allowances can be beneficial compared to domestic 
reductions. Altogether, the total emission level is reduced by 11.4 percent when including carbon 
sequestration.  
 
The result of the scenario with sequestration but without uncertainty is found in Appendix B, 
Table B2. In short, both the MACs and the abatement costs are reduced, or equal for four 
countries, compared with the scenario with sequestration and uncertainty. With certain 
sequestration, one ton of CO2 sequestered in forests is equivalent to one ton due to fossil fuel 
reductions, whereas under uncertainty one ton of CO2 sequestered in forests is valued less than 
one ton due to fossil fuel reductions. Net costs are lower in the deterministic scenario for most 
countries due to the lower abatement costs and smaller purchases of allowances for net buyers. 
The allowance price in the ETS sector falls to 11€/ton CO2. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
net costs increase because of the smaller demand for allowance permits in combination with the 
lower price which reduces their net gains from trading. Emissions are higher in all countries in  
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the deterministic scenario compared to the stochastic scenario, as there are no extra emission 
reductions undertaken with a purpose to provide a safety-margin with regard to target 
achievement.  
 
4. Results from the equity assessment  
 
In order to assess the equity in EU’s burden-sharing scheme, the six equity criteria in Table 1 
have been calculated for the three scenarios mentioned above. In the following, Lorenz curves 
and Gini-coefficients for different criteria and scenarios are presented. Due to the similarity with 
the stated aims of the EU burden allocation, we first discuss the horizontal and ability to pay 
criteria.   
 
Figure 2 shows the Lorenz curve for the horizontal equity criterion. Closest to the 45° equity line 
is the Lorenz curve for the case without sequestration, followed by that for the scenario with 
sequestration and uncertainty and the one with sequestration, but no uncertainty. The distribution 
is thus more unequal when sequestration is included and the most unequal in the deterministic 
sequestration scenario. Equality changes when sequestration is included because there is a large 
variation in forest area and per hectare sequestration, implying that the gains from inclusion of 
sequestration are unevenly distributed. The effect on distribution of the horizontal equity 
criterion is determined by whether this leads to a more similar or more different distribution of 
net costs compared to the distribution of GDP. In the scenario with sequestration and uncertainty, 
the net cost to GDP will fall more for countries with low sequestration uncertainty than for 
countries with high uncertainty, compared to the scenario where sequestration is not included.    
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Figure 2. Lorenz curves for the horizontal equity criterion i.e. net cost in relation to GDP.  
 
Calculations of the correlation coefficient  for forest land and GDP based on data in Tables A1 
and B1 in the respective appendices give a value of  0.72. This suggests that wealthier countries 
will benefit more from inclusion of sequestration than poor countries. Uncertainty in carbon 
sequestration and GDP could be positively correlated if uncertainty is to large extent determined 
by the quality and quantity of forest statistics and land mapping, given that both can be resource 
demanding. The estimated correlation coefficient between GDP and the coefficient of variation 
of carbon sequestration is however only -0.20, implying that there is no strong relationship 
between these two factors. The results show no clear pattern with regards to groups of countries 
benefitting from the inclusion of sequestration.  
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The distribution of the ability to pay criterion results in the same ranking of scenarios with regard 
to equity as the horizontal, see Figure 3. However, the magnitude of the difference between 
scenarios increases, as shown by the Lorenz curves. The explanation for this is that allowance 
trading leads to a dispersal of the benefits of sequestration among all involved countries. It is 
well known that allowance trading is beneficial due to the potential to lower cost compared the 
use of separate, national targets, and because equity can be dealt with through the initial 
distribution of allowances. Our results suggest that emission trading systems already in place can 
serve as a buffer against inequality, when new cheap abatement measures are introduced.  
  
Figure 3. Lorenz curves for the ability to pay equity criterion i.e. abatement cost to GDP.  
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Figure 4. Gini-coefficients for all six equity criteria 
 
Gini-coefficients are calculated for all six equity criteria. Figure 4 shows that Gini-coefficients 
range between 0.11-0.32 without sequestration, 0.19-0.38 with sequestration and uncertainty and 
0.16-0.66 with sequestration, but without uncertainty. Inequality increases with the inclusion of 
sequestration, more in the deterministic scenario than in the probabilistic one, except for the 
egalitarian equity criterion. The larger inequality in the deterministic scenario is explained by 
the certain sequestration potential being more valuable than the uncertain potential, in 
combination with the unequal distribution of forest area.  
 
Gini-coefficients for the egalitarian criterion are low compared to those for other criteria due to 
the strong correlation between countries population size and emissions. This criterion differs  
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from the others in that the distribution is more equal under deterministic sequestration than under 
probabilistic. The reason is that forest sequestration is more or less uncorrelated with population 
wherefore equality is reduced when including sequestration. The impact of forest sequestration 
on emissions levels is larger in the probabilistic scenario as larger reductions need to be 
undertaken in order to comply with targets, which explains the larger inequality in the 
probabilistic scenario compared to the deterministic.  
 
Results can be compared with the average Gini-coefficient for the income distribution, which 
equaled 0.31 in 2011 (Eurostat, 2013). In the scenario without sequestration, all Gini-coefficients 
calculated here are lower than that for income, except for the market justice criterion where it is 
just above. In the scenario with sequestration under uncertainty, four out of six equity criteria 
give Gini-coefficients below that for the income distribution, whereas in the scenario with 
deterministic sequestration, all Gini-coefficients but one are above that for the income. 
 
      5.  Discussion and conclusion 
 
We evaluate equity in the outcome of cost-efficient EU climate policies to 2020, comparing three 
different scenarios; 1) when targets can only be met through fossil fuel reductions, 2) when 
uncertain carbon sequestration is added as an abatement option, and 3) when sequestration is 
included but treated as certain. Results show that there is a trade-off between lower costs and 
increased inequality when including sequestration. The abatement costs are reduced by 53% in 
the scenario with stochastic sequestration and 85% in the scenario with deterministic 
sequestration, compared to the scenario without sequestration. 
 
To evaluate the equity in the burden-sharing, six different equity criteria were applied to the 
outcomes of cost effective solutions. With stochastic sequestration, Gini-coefficients increase by 
11-65 percent, and with deterministic sequestration by 32-173 percent. The inclusion of 
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sequestration thus leads to larger disparities among countries. Yet with stochastic sequestration, 
most Gini-coefficients are below that for the income distribution within the EU. When 
sequestration is treated as certain inequality increases further as sequestration is assigned a 
higher value with regard to compliance with targets, compared to when it is treated as uncertain. 
The impact on policy outcomes is therefore larger.  
 
An interesting result is that the presence of international emission trading seems to be a buffer 
against negative equity consequences from the introduction of a new, low-cost abatement option 
such as sequestration. This buffering effect is explained by the benefits from sequestration being 
dispersed among countries through the impact on allowance demand and supply.    
 
Comparing our results with those of Rose et al. (1998), our study confirms that the sovereignty 
and horizontal criteria give comparable outcomes. In their study, these two criteria result in 
similar net costs of mitigation, whereas in our case, the criteria give comparable Gini-
coefficients in the scenario without sequestration. Both studies find the egalitarian criterion to 
give quite different results than other criteria. Rose et al. (1998) find that under this criterion, all 
industrialised countries are buyers and all developing countries sellers of allowances, leading to a 
net gain for developing countries. We show that the egalitarian criterion gives substantially 
lower Gini-coefficients than other criteria.  
 
The stated aim of the European Commission (2008b), when proposing the burden-sharing, was 
to ensure that efforts and costs were distributed in an equitable manner and that accelerated 
growth in less wealthy countries was allowed for. Our results show that both the magnitude and 
direction of change in Gini-coefficients when policies are adjusted depend on the choice of 
equity criterion. It is therefore important to thoroughly evaluate the choice of criteria to use, 
when equity criteria are used as inputs in the policy process, given that there no generally 
accepted definition of equity. Moreover, criteria which measure the inequality in the overall 
distribution of outcomes need to be supplemented with an analysis of outcomes for individual  
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countries as well as groups of countries, even though in our case, results do not show any clear 
pattern with regards to groups of countries. 
 
The burden sharing as well as the allocation of allowances within the EU has undergone 
revisions over time. Whereas we note that the introduction of a new, low-cost abatement option 
such as sequestration can have a negative impact on equity, such impacts can be reduced in 
connection with a revision of targets or  allocation of allowances, e.g. through increasing the 
number of allowances to countries that are disadvantaged from the introduction of sequestration.  
 
It should also be noted that whereas increased sequestration can have substantial benefits for 
climate policy, it could also affect other ecosystem services provided by forests such as, e.g., 
biodiversity. Such side-effects from sequestration are not dealt with in our paper but can be 
important for policy choices. Further limitations of the study are the static perspective, and the 
inclusion of only two kinds of abatement options. Inclusion of additional abatement options, 
such as renewable energy and carbon sequestration in the agricultural sector, could affect the 
results. Furthermore, the study only includes carbon sequestration as  a by-product of current 
forest management and inclusion of measures to increase sequestration through changes in land 
use, and forest and agricultural practice, could also affect conclusions. Results should therefore 
be interpreted with care.  
 
Footnotes 
 
1 Other abatement options such as renewable energies, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and agricultural 
sequestration are currently not part of the model. The limited number of abatement options can imply that the 
estimated MAC is higher than if cheap, additional options were included. However, many renewable energy sources 
such as wind power and solar energy, as well as CCS are associated with considerable costs, wherefore it is at least 
not obvious that they would be included in a cost-efficient solution. 
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2 Consumer surplus is represented by the area below the demand function and above the price line. Energy 
efficiency is indirectly taken into account in the cost functions as the possibility of energy efficiency improvements 
affects fossil fuel demand elasticities. 
 
3 This value could be reduced if demand for, e.g., bioenergy or timber changes due to political decisions or changes 
in demand. Measures to increase sequestration are not included in the model, but could be an interesting subject for 
further research. 
 
Appendix A 
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Table A1. Member states forest area, emission factors and uncertainties 
        
Emission factor: Net 
CO2   
  
Total forest 
area 
Mineral 
soil Organic soil 
Mineral 
soil  
Organic 
soil Uncertaintyb 
Country 1000 haa 1000 haa 1000 haa Mg C/ha Mg C/ha 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Austria 3620 3620   -1.49 -1.35 0.30 
Belgium 621 621   -1.22 -1.18 0.10 
Bulgaria 4076 4076   -0.47 -0.47 0.80 
Cyprus 1 1   - - 0.80 
Czech 
Republic 2593 2574 19 -0.48 -0.48 0.30 
Denmark 476 458 18 -1.58 -1.57 0.28 
Estonia 2252 1480 772 -0.81 0.28 0.37 
Finland 22146 16105 6041 -0.61 -0.22 0.37 
France 16384 16384   -1.41 -1.36 0.58 
Germany 10799 10799   -2.00 -2.00 0.30 
Greece 6560 6560   -0.18 -0.18 0.80 
Hungary 1806 1806   -0.70 -0.70 0.30 
Ireland 554 543 11 -0.56 3.25 1.04 
Italy 11261 11261   -2.30 -1.28 0.62 
Latvia 2929 2929   -1.67 -1.67 0.30 
Lithuania 2030 2030   -1.14 -1.14 0.30 
Luxemburg 1 1   - - 0.67 
Malta 1 1   - - 0.62 
Netherlands 479 479   -1.43 -1.43 0.67 
Poland 8991 8752 239 -1.66 -1.22 0.30 
Portugal 3476 3476   -0.48 -0.46 0.40 
Romania 6755 6755   -1.51 -1.51 0.80 
Slovakia 1932 1927 5 -0.44 -0.44 0.80 
Slovenia 1174 1174   -1.10 -1.10 0.80 
Spain 14191 14191   -0.64 -0.64 0.40 
Sweden 25501 23235 2266 -0.36 0.15 0.20 
United 
Kingdom 2229 2229   -1.64 -1.91 0.23 
Total 152836.57           
Source: UNFCCC, 2009           
a Note that Cyprus, Malta and Luxemburg have not reported any forest area or emission factors, therefore 
assumed to be 1. 
b With regard to uncertainty, the following countries are assumed to have the same uncertainty as Greece: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. The same as Austria: Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Germany, Czech Republic. The same as Finland: Estonia. The same as Portugal: Malta, Spain. The same as 
Netherlands: Luxemburg.   
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Non-ETS targets, total emissions, GDP and population  
  Non-ETS targets  Total emissions 2005 GDP  2020 Population 2005 
 Units % Thousand ton CO2 Million €uro Total 
Austria -16 73700 310400 8201359 
Belgium -15 107800 389500 10445852 
Bulgaria 20 45100 34700 7761049 
Cyprus -5 7400 22500 749175 
Czech Republic 9 114800 154200 10220577 
Denmark -20 48900 245900 5411405 
Estonia 11 15200 15400 1347510 
Finland -16 54100 201400 5236611 
France -14 378400 2144400 62772870 
Germany  -14 804800 2723600 82500849 
Greece -4 96200 290600 11082751 
Hungary 10 55000 114800 10097549 
Ireland -20 45700 221700 4109173 
Italy -13 451000 1678700 58462375 
Latvia 17 7300 17400 2306434 
Lithuania 15 12600 30300 3425324 
Luxembourg  -20 12400 47300 461230 
Malta 5 3000 6800 402668 
Netherlands -16 171600 637900 16305526 
Poland 14 290700 406100 38173835 
Portugal 1 61600 179600 10529255 
Romania 19 89700 135000 21658528 
Slovakia 13 37100 73300 5384822 
Slovenia 4 15200 44000 1997590 
Spain -10 339400 1285200 43038035 
Sweden -17 48500 380300 9011392 
United Kingdom -16 559700 2373000 60059900 
Source: Member states targets can be found in Directive 406/2009/EC. Emissions and Population are from Eurostat 
and GDP forecast from European Commission, 2009. 
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Table B2. Marginal cost, abatement cost, net cost and emissions in 2020 in the deterministic  
                scenario with sequestration   
 
 
 MAC  Abatement cost  Net cost  Emissions 2020  
Unit  
€/ton CO2 (PPP 
adjusted) Million Euro  Million Euro  Thousand ton CO2 
Austria 10 14 63 54942 
Belgium 109 852 821 98278 
Bulgaria 29 31 37 38567 
Cyprus 62 11 12 6980 
Czech Republic 18 49 128 100030 
Denmark 95 164 245 42078 
Estonia 18 12 12 11086 
Finland 9 19 111 18457 
France 10 42 141 290310 
Germany  10 287 1511 677660 
Greece 15 39 133 91907 
Hungary 54 61 64 53121 
Ireland 90 368 417 41699 
Italy 10 90 512 390980 
Latvia 21 3 -12 -12560 
Lithuania 13 2 -28 3686 
Luxembourg  138 237 237 10913 
Malta 6 0 1 2333 
Netherlands 34 1074 1180 161110 
Poland 19 204 405 239710 
Portugal 12 23 68 61642 
Romania 23 62 -73 60168 
Slovakia 42 25 3 36396 
Slovenia 14 8 26 11486 
Spain 12 87 283 323600 
Sweden 9 8 5 27148 
United Kingdom 103 1876 2548 492050 
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Appendix C  
Table C1. Equity criteria results without sequestration 
Equity criteria Ab. to pay Egalitarian Horizontal Mkt. Justice Polluters Pay Sovereignty 
Equity measure Ab. 
Cost/GDP  
Emission 
/Population 
Net 
Cost/GDP  
 MAC (PPP 
adj.) 
Net cost (PPP 
adj.)/emission 
Emission 
reduction 
Unit  % ton 
CO2/capita 
% €/ton CO2 €/ton CO2 % 
Austria 0.305 7.8 0.319 95.9 12.4 12.9 
Belgium 0.320 9.1 0.279 93.7 9.0 11.8 
Bulgaria 0.800 4.6 0.241 172.0 4.9 20.3 
Cyprus 0.071 9.0 0.055 49.6 1.9 9.0 
Czech Republic 0.267 8.5 0.148 61.2 3.3 24.1 
Denmark 0.277 6.9 0.313 61.9 11.1 23.4 
Estonia 0.781 8.7 0.274 92.1 4.5 23.2 
Finland 0.150 8.4 0.198 36.0 6.0 19.0 
France 0.129 5.3 0.131 78.2 6.5 12.8 
Germany 0.224 7.6 0.265 52.4 8.1 22.1 
Greece 0.127 7.5 0.126 45.6 4.4 13.9 
Hungary 0.590 4.9 0.505 289.8 16.4 10.7 
Ireland 0.250 9.6 0.280 72.4 10.7 13.8 
Italy 0.345 7.1 0.378 101.0 12.9 7.3 
Latvia 2.439 3.1 2.102 1193.9 94.0 1.0 
Lithuania 0.040 3.1 -0.271 51.5 -12.2 16.0 
Luxemburg 0.510 23.2 0.500 110.6 16.7 13.8 
Malta 0.033 5.6 0.033 39.8 1.0 25.5 
Netherlands 0.213 9.6 0.236 14.7 3.7 9.2 
Poland 0.440 6.0 0.244 98.6 5.8 20.7 
Portugal 0.182 5.7 0.177 60.6 5.9 2.9 
Romania 0.811 3.8 0.284 230.4 8.8 7.9 
Slovakia 0.790 5.9 0.563 234.1 20.1 13.9 
Slovenia 0.519 6.5 0.515 141.1 19.6 14.5 
Spain 0.278 7.1 0.273 114.4 10.8 10.4 
Sweden 0.614 5.0 0.602 213.7 38.1 6.5 
United Kingdom 0.211 7.5 0.241 69.6 8.6 19.3 
Mean 0.434 7.3 0.334 143.5 12.3 14.3 
Gini Coeff. 0.241 0.112 0.200 0.315 0.245 0.215 
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Table C2. Equity criteria results with sequestration and uncertainty 
Equity criteria Ab. to pay Egalitarian Horizontal Mkt Justice Polluter Pay Sovereignty 
Equity measure Abatement 
Cost/GDP 
Emission 
/Population 
Net Cost/GDP   MAC (PPP 
adj.) 
Net cost (PPP 
adj.)/emission 
Emission 
reduction 
Unit  % ton CO2/capita % €/ton CO2 €/ton CO2 % 
       
Austria 0.023 6.3 0.041 21.7 1.6 30.0 
Belgium 0.240 9.2 0.211 82.5 6.8 11.2 
Bulgaria 0.740 3.7 0.330 166.6 6.7 35.8 
Cyprus 0.063 9.1 0.057 48.8 1.9 8.1 
Czech Republic 0.160 8.7 0.120 41.9 2.7 22.9 
Denmark 0.144 7.0 0.186 42.4 6.6 22.5 
Estonia 0.384 6.2 -0.019 39.9 -0.3 45.4 
Finland 0.048 2.7 0.105 19.3 3.2 74.2 
France 0.047 4.2 0.051 46.5 2.5 30.1 
Germany 0.053 7.4 0.101 21.5 3.1 24.3 
Greece 0.112 7.2 0.125 42.7 4.3 16.6 
Hungary 0.210 4.7 0.148 91.3 4.8 14.1 
Ireland 0.249 9.4 0.275 71.7 10.5 15.9 
Italy 0.206 5.6 0.242 73.3 8.3 27.1 
Latvia 0.086 -5.7 -0.170 58.1 -7.6 281.6 
Lithuania 0.028 1.0 -0.219 42.7 -9.9 73.8 
Luxemburg 0.507 23.3 0.501 111.9 16.7 13.3 
Malta 0.022 5.6 0.032 32.9 1.0 24.6 
Netherlands 0.205 9.5 0.229 14.4 3.6 9.5 
Poland 0.253 5.0 0.138 45.8 3.3 34.1 
Portugal 0.071 5.3 0.071 30.2 2.3 9.4 
Romania 0.787 1.6 0.370 229.7 11.4 60.5 
Slovakia 0.313 5.7 0.134 123.3 4.8 17.5 
Slovenia 0.093 4.8 0.093 32.4 3.5 37.2 
Spain 0.103 6.7 0.105 54.1 4.2 15.1 
Sweden 0.010 2.8 0.002 18.2 0.2 47.7 
United Kingdom 0.127 7.6 0.162 52.4 5.8 18.2 
Mean 0.196 6.1 0.127 61.3 3.8 37.8 
Gini Coeff. 0.384 0.185 0.309 0.360 0.288 0.239 
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Table C3. Equity criteria results with sequestration, without uncertainty 
Equity criteria Ab. to pay Egalitarian Horizontal Mkt Justice Polluters Pay Sovereignty 
Equity measure Abatement 
Cost/GDP  
Emission 
/Population 
Net Cost/GDP  MAC (PPP 
adj.) 
Net cost (PPP 
adj.)/Emissions 
Emission 
reduction 
Unit  % ton CO2/capita % €/ton CO2 €/ton CO2 % 
       
Austria 0.005 6.7 0.020 9.9 0.8 25.5 
Belgium 0.219 9.4 0.211 87.9 6.8 8.8 
Bulgaria 0.090 5.0 0.108 33.3 2.2 14.5 
Cyprus 0.050 9.3 0.055 52.5 1.8 5.7 
Czech Republic 0.032 9.8 0.083 19.2 1.9 12.9 
Denmark 0.067 7.8 0.100 35.0 3.5 14.0 
Estonia 0.079 8.2 0.078 18.3 1.3 27.1 
Finland 0.009 3.5 0.055 8.8 1.7 65.9 
France 0.002 4.6 0.007 9.1 0.3 23.3 
Germany 0.011 8.2 0.055 9.8 1.7 15.8 
Greece 0.013 8.3 0.046 13.3 1.6 4.5 
Hungary 0.053 5.3 0.056 47.3 1.8 3.4 
Ireland 0.166 10.1 0.188 58.0 7.2 8.8 
Italy 0.005 6.7 0.030 9.9 1.0 13.3 
Latvia 0.017 1.6 -0.071 26.6 -3.2 49.5 
Lithuania 0.006 -3.7 -0.092 21.4 -4.1 199.7 
Luxemburg 0.501 23.7 0.501 116.3 16.7 12.0 
Malta 0.004 5.8 0.020 15.0 0.6 22.2 
Netherlands 0.168 9.9 0.185 13.2 2.9 6.1 
Poland 0.050 6.3 0.100 21.0 2.4 17.5 
Portugal 0.013 5.9 0.038 12.8 1.3 -0.1 
Romania 0.046 2.8 -0.054 24.1 -1.7 32.9 
Slovakia 0.034 6.8 0.004 26.8 0.1 1.9 
Slovenia 0.019 5.7 0.059 14.8 2.3 24.4 
Spain 0.007 7.5 0.022 11.6 0.9 4.7 
Sweden 0.002 3.0 0.001 8.3 0.1 44.0 
United Kingdom 0.079 8.2 0.107 52.5 3.9 12.1 
Mean 0.065 6.9 0.071 28.8 2.1 24.8 
Gini Coeff. 0.657 0.161 0.492 0.416 0.448 0.326 
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